The ongoing democratic transitions in Africa are posing critical and complex issues of constitutional control and reform of security structures on the continent. While African armed forces and other security agencies are often weak and politically discredited, they nevertheless continue, in many countries, to command more than sufficient power to assert their autonomy of both government and society, and even overturn elected administrations. On the other hand, the deteriorating state of security and human rights on the continent in recent years suggests that security agencies are ill-equipped to execute their mandates of protecting society.

Restructuring of African security agencies is urgently required to enhance both professionalism and civil control and accountability. This is turn raises a host of practical issues: What is the most appropriate strategy for restoring, and sustaining, civil control of militaries and security agencies in fragile African democracies? How should such democracies be seeking to reshape their security doctrines and infrastructures? What role should civilian authorities play in determining such issues as defence policy and mission objectives or military procurement? What institutional arrangements best embody the twin principles of military expertise and civilian supremacy? In Africa, with few exceptions, issues of national defence and public security have not attracted nearly the level of public and policy debate or scholarly attention that the subject matter deserves. This is particularly true of their implications for democratic consolidation.

In most countries historically weak capacity to implement civil control has combined with low professionalism and operational effectiveness of the armed forces and security agencies to make this a difficult and volatile area for emergent democracies. While reforms are sorely needed, resource shortages and political considerations are likely to place severe constraints on what reforms are likely or feasible.